Abstract: Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, memberfinanced enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government's environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.
Introduction
In recent years there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary environmental agreements between regulators and polluting industries in place of standard regulatory approaches. In many of these arrangements the government agrees not to impose a costly conventional regulation on an industry provided that it can meet an environmental quality objective voluntarily. These forms of voluntary agreements are typically referred to as negotiated agreements, and are the most common voluntary approach used in Europe (Conrad 2001 to have a number of advantages over traditional regulation. Firms may enjoy significant costsavings from having increased flexibility in deciding how to meet an environmental target (Baggot 1986; Goodin 1986) . Furthermore, voluntary agreements may help reduce the time necessary to develop traditional forms of regulation and may reduce conflicts between regulators and firms that often occur in this process (Segerson and Miceli 1998) . Finally, some authors have suggested that voluntary agreements are likely to be cheaper to enforce than traditional regulations (Bailey 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Brouhle et al. 2005; Croci 2005 ).
While the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental regulation has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that voluntary environmental agreements with industries must be enforced, either by the government, or by the industry itself. This paper examines the consequences of enforcement costs that are borne by the members of voluntary agreements on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of voluntary participation with these agreements, the relative costs of enforcing voluntary agreements and conventional regulations, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches.
Most existing theoretical analyses of voluntary agreements model simple agreements
made between the government and a single firm, or a series of independent agreements with an arbitrary number of firms (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Segerson and Miceli 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Nyborg 2000; Lyon and Maxwell 2003) . 2 Modeling voluntary agreements in this way 1 For reviews of voluntary agreements in Europe and the United States see EEA (1997) , Mazurek (1998) , Brouhle et al. (2005) , and Schnabl (2005) .
2 The main conclusion of these studies is that voluntary approaches are most likely to meet environmental targets when there is a strong background threat of costly mandatory regulation. The limited empirical evidence on voluntary agreements largely supports this claim (Davies and Mazurek 1996; Khanna and Damon 1999; Lyon and Maxwell 2002; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000; Alberini and Segerson 2002) .
precludes the important possibility that an environmental agreement with an industry may involve only a subset of firms while the remaining firms free ride. Recently, Dawson and Segerson (2007) examine the causes and consequences of this free-riding problem. In their model, a regulator offers an industry the opportunity to voluntarily meet an aggregate emissions target instead of imposing an emissions tax that would meet the target. To determine the equilibrium number of participating firms with a voluntary agreement, Dawson and Segerson use the concept of self-enforcing agreements that was developed to examine stable cartels (D'Aspremont et al. 1983; Diamontoudi 2005) and is used extensively in the literature on international environmental agreements (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007) . Dawson and Segerson demonstrate that voluntary agreements can meet environmental quality goals, but they will typically involve less than full participation of the firms in an industry. Because some firms free-ride on the emission control of other firms, voluntary
agreements cannot be expected to distribute emission control responsibilities efficiently.
Though widely used, the term self-enforcing agreement is a bit misleading, because it refers to the stability of voluntary agreements, not to maintaining the compliance of the members of an agreement. Like most authors who use this equilibrium concept, Dawson and Segerson assume that once a self-enforcing agreement has formed, the members of the agreement will not violate its requirements. Building from their model, we examine a voluntary agreement made between a government and industry in which firms that join the agreement have an incentive to violate its requirements if it is not properly enforced.. To counteract this incentive, we assume that the members of an agreement not only agree to reduce their emissions so that the regulatory objective is achieved, they also finance and empower an independent enforcer to monitor their performance and to apply a sanction when it discovers a member firm has failed to meet its emissions control requirement. We also address the claim that voluntary agreements may be cheaper to enforce than traditional regulation. Bailey (1999) speculates that this may be true, because only the subset of firms that join a voluntary agreement need to be monitored. Others predict a cost savings because of expected advantages an industry-led enforcement scheme has over government enforcement (Schmelzer 1999) . For example, it is possible that an enforcer of a voluntary agreement has better information than the government about firms' incentives and could therefore monitor their compliance behavior more effectively. Additionally, industry-led enforcement may be capable of imposing higher penalties for noncompliance, for example, by revoking the membership of noncompliant firms in trade associations (Nyborg 2000) .
We demonstrate that a voluntary agreement is not cheaper to enforce than an emissions tax when the enforcer of the agreement possesses the same monitoring technology and sanction as the government. Voluntary agreements are cheaper to enforce only if the enforcer of such an agreement has an advantage over the government in its ability to monitor participating firms and the sanctions it can levy on noncompliant parties. Moreover, we show that it is always possible that an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement has a large enough advantage over the government that a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement can achieve an industry-wide emissions target more efficiently than an emissions tax. In these cases, the enforcement cost advantage of a voluntary agreement is greater than the loss from the inefficient distribution of emissions control responsibilities that Dawson and Segerson identify.
We also consider the possibility that government enforcement of a voluntary agreement is more efficient than member-financed enforcement. Voluntary agreements that are enforced by the government can be more efficient than those with member-financed enforcement, but only if the government's enforcement capabilities are significantly better than those of an alternative enforcer. However, we also show that there are no situations in which government-enforced voluntary agreements are more efficient than an emissions tax. Thus, our results suggest that voluntary emissions control agreements with industries can be an efficient means of achieving environmental quality goals, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exist member-financed agreements that reach the government's environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of an agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.
Voluntary environmental agreements that do not require member-financed enforcement
Although Dawson and Segerson (2007) probably intended to assume away enforcement issues and their costs, one can interpret their results as arising from a model of a self-enforcing environmental agreement for which the government takes on the burden of enforcing compliance with the requirements of the agreement. In this section we present a somewhat simplified version of Dawson and Segerson's model of a self-enforcing environmental agreement to highlight the structure of these games, and to provide a baseline for our model of voluntary agreements with member-financed enforcement.
Basic setup
Following Dawson and Segerson (2007) , we limit our analysis to an industry of n identical firms that emit a uniformly mixed pollutant. Each firm possesses a strictly concave profit function 
A self-enforcing voluntary agreement
Suppose the government is willing to not impose the emissions tax if the industry can reach the desired level of emissions, , through a voluntary emissions control agreement. Because ( ) ne t participation in the agreement is voluntary, individual firms freely choose whether they will become a member of the agreement. Participation with a voluntary agreement is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each firm decides independently whether to join the agreement. In the second stage, all firms choose their levels of emissions. Those who indicate that they will not join an agreement in the first stage choose their uncontrolled levels, , in the second stage. In contrast, the members of the agreement commit to individual emissions standards that limit the entire industry's emissions to the government's aggregate target, provided that they can do so while remaining at least as well off as they would be under the emissions tax. If these conditions are met, then the government does not impose the tax and each member of the agreement holds their emissions to their agreed upon standard. These standards are chosen by the agreement members to maximize their joint profit, which, since the firms are identical, implies that they agree to uniform emission standards. If the firms that join a voluntary agreement in the first stage of the game cannot reduce their emissions far enough to meet the government's industry-wide target, or they are able to do so but they would be worse off than under the emission tax, they do not follow through with an agreement to reduce their emissions to meet the government's target. In response the government imposes the emissions tax. 
is increasing in the number of members of an agreement, but is decreasing in the emissions tax. More members implies that the burden of holding industry emissions to ne(t) is distributed among more firms. On the other hand, a higher emissions tax implies that the government is trying to induce a lower aggregate standard. Thus, given a fixed membership in a voluntary agreement, each member of the agreement must reduce its emission further to achieve the government's goal.
Now let us turn to the profit levels of the members and nonmembers of a voluntary agreement when its members are able to satisfy the government's aggregate emissions target. with the following characteristics:
s n t e t t t b t b
π π clear that the incentive and opportunity exist to form a cooperative agreement to avoid the emissions tax, it is also quite clear that every firm is motivated to free-ride on efforts to do so.
Note in Figure 1 that there exist coalitions that are profitable in the sense that each member of these coalitions is at least as well off as under the emissions tax. Use [10] To determine the number of firms that will join a voluntary emissions control agreement in the first stage, Dawson and Segerson (2006) adopt the equilibrium concept of a self-enforcing agreement that is employed in the study of cartels (D'Aspremont et al. 1983) , and international environmental agreements (Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007 
The sign follows from the fact that b makes t > 1/ 2 2b t t − > . Note, however, that setting b = t to achieve of complete ban on emissions makes a voluntary agreement and the emissions tax equally efficient. This is because the self-enforcing agreement to achieve a ban on industry emissions requires the participation of all firms in the industry. To see this, note from emissions control agreement should include an enforcement dimension. Moreover, the relative costs of enforcing a voluntary agreement and enforcing an emissions tax, as well as who bears the costs of enforcing the agreement, will impact the relative efficiency of these agreements. In the next section we extend Dawson and Segerson's (2007) model to include member-financing of an independent enforcer who is responsible for maintaining compliance with the terms of a voluntary emissions control agreement.
Voluntary environmental agreements with member-financed enforcement
We now give the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement the opportunity to violate the emissions standard specified under the agreement. To counteract the incentive toward noncompliance the members of an agreement fund an independent enforcer who monitors the firms' emissions and applies a penalty when it finds a violation. productivity of enforcement resources in producing audits. Since audits are random, the probability that any one firm will be audited is
Note that given a fixed contribution by each member of the agreement, increasing the number of members does not change the audit probability because each additional member contributes enough to keep that probability constant. However, we will see shortly that the contribution of each member, and hence the audit probability, will depend on the number of members.
Moreover, we will demonstrate exactly what is required to make (0, 1] ρ ∈ .
A member of a voluntary agreement is noncompliant when its emissions exceed the emissions standard that is necessary for the member firms to meet the government's aggregate target. Recall that this standard is from equation [9] . If the enforcer finds a firm in violation it imposes a unit fine of f on The fine is constrained to be no more than f .
Emissions stage
At this point in the game the members of a voluntary agreement have agreed to reduce their emissions to meet the government's target and have funded the enforcer. In the emissions stage both members of the agreement and nonmembers independently choose their emissions.
Nonmembers have no incentive to control their emissions, so they each choose their uncontrolled levels e u specified by [2] . Member firms, however, hold their emissions to e(s, t) if and only if the agreement is enforced adequately. To simplify the analysis, we restrict ourselves to enforcement strategies that guarantee full compliance by the members of the agreement.
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Assume that the firms are risk neutral and that members of an agreement comply with its emissions standard if they are at least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Each of them chooses their emissions to maximize their expected net profit; that is, they solve max ( ) ( ( , )), . . lower standard, the audit probability required to maintain their compliance must increase as the emissions tax is increased.
Agreement stage
The . Since x is monotonically decreasing in the fine for noncompliance, the members of the agreement will all agree that the fine should be as high as possible; that is, f f = . The required payment is decreasing in the number of members of the agreement and increasing in the tax, simply because the minimum audit probability that is required to maintain compliance with an effective agreement (given by equation [16] ) is also decreasing in the number of members and increasing in the tax.
Members of a voluntary agreement will agree to a uniform emissions standard to meet the government's target and to fund the enforcer if and only if they are at least as well off as under the emission tax; that is, the agreement must be profitable for each of its members. We explore the profitability of voluntary agreements with member-financed enforcement thoroughly in the next section. For now, let us just say that profitability depends on the number of firms that decide to join the agreement in the first stage of the game (i.e., the membership stage). If a sufficient number of firms join the agreement in the first stage, they will agree to an emissions standard to meet the government's target and fund the enforcer in the second. In response, the government does not impose the emissions tax. Since funds for the enforcer are sufficient to guarantee full compliance, in the third stage each member complies with the agreed-upon standard. In the fourth stage the enforcer conducts its random audits of the members' emissions, but finds no violations. On the other hand, if too few firms join the agreement in the first stage, the agreement will not be profitable. The members then do not agree to control their emissions, there is no need to fund the enforcer, and the government imposes the tax on all firms.
Equilibrium voluntary agreements that require member-financed enforcement
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game we've just described is either a selfenforcing agreement under which all members of the agreement limit their emissions to meet the government's aggregate target, or an effective agreement does not form and the government imposes the emissions tax. In this section we derive the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement and compare it to the equilibrium obtained under the assumption that an agreement does not require member-financed enforcement. We begin by examining the profitability requirement of voluntary emissions control agreements with member-financed enforcement.
Profitable voluntary agreements
Recall from subsection 2.1 that to reach the government's aggregate emissions target, each member of a voluntary agreement must hold their emissions to e(s, t) defined by [9] , which they are able to do if and only if . Otherwise, an effective agreement cannot form.
Moreover, recall from [16] and the discussion that followed that to guarantee that the enforcer of an agreement can maintain compliance with its emissions standard we also need
To focus on situations in which an effective agreement with member-financed enforcement can actually form, we limit our analysis to agreements with memberships
The profit of each member of a voluntary agreement consists of its gross profit from holding its emissions to e(s, t) minus its payment to the enforcer x(s) defined by [17] . For is required for an effective agreement reveals that the costs of enforcement can be sufficiently high to prevent an agreement from forming. Loosely, the likelihood that an agreement can form is reduced as the marginal productivity of monitoring resources, α , or the size of the maximum available sanction, f , is reduced. Reducing either of these parameters increases the payment to the enforcer required of all agreement members, which leads to a decrease in the set of opportunities for an effective agreement.
A self-enforcing voluntary agreement that requires member-financed enforcement
Like the model of self-enforcing voluntary agreements without member-financed enforcement in section 2, a self-enforcing agreement with member-financed enforcement must be both internally and externally stable. Again like the model of section 2, it is easy to show that the only internally and externally stable coalition size is the smallest profitable coalition, provided that a profitable coalition actually exists From Lemma 2 and the discussion that followed, profitable agreements with member-financed enforcement exist if and only if ( )
. Under this condition, the smallest profitable coalition is: To sign this expression note that it is increasing in b′′ and is equal to zero when Since we assume . This proves our next proposition. The reason for this result is straightforward. Since contributing to the enforcement of a voluntary agreement is an additional cost of joining one, more firms are required to participate to make the agreement profitable. Figure 2 illustrates the main differences between effective agreements that require member-financed enforcement and those that do not. We have graphed along with a candidate for that allows an agreement with member-financed enforcement to form. When a voluntary agreement that requires member-financed enforcement forms the number of free-riders on the agreement will be less than if the agreement did not require costly enforcement, or if the government enforced the agreement. Recall that Dawson and Segerson (2007) showed that free-riding makes voluntary agreements inefficient in the sense that aggregate industry profit at the government's aggregate emissions target is not maximized.
Since free-riding is reduced when agreement members finance their own enforcement, the inefficiency associated with free-riding is also less. But whether an effective voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement can ever be more efficient than an emissions tax requires that we include the relative costs of enforcing voluntary agreements and emissions taxes in a welfare comparison of the two policy approaches. The relative efficiency of voluntary emissions control agreements and emissions taxes is the topic of the next section.
The relative efficiency of voluntary environmental agreements

The cost of enforcing an emissions tax
To compare the relative efficiency of a voluntary agreement and an emissions tax, we first need to derive the cost of enforcing a tax. Under an emissions tax, each firm in the industry is required to submit a report of its emissions, r, and it is noncompliant if it attempts to evade some part of its tax liability by reporting r e < . After the firms release their emissions and submit their emission reports, the government randomly audits the emissions of some subset of the firms so that the probability that any one of them is audited is 12 Contributions to the theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions taxes include Harford (1978 and 1987) , Sandmo (2002) , Cremer and Gahvari (2002), and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) . Recently, Stranlund et al (2007) argue that it is normally efficient to enforce emissions taxes so that firms are compliant if the costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms are greater than the costs of collecting tax revenue.
Under the assumption that a firm will comply if it is indifferent between compliance and profit under the tax is defined by [5] and its profit net of its tax payment is defined by [7] .
In enforcing the emission tax the government has the same sort of linear monitoring [25]
Can a voluntary emissions control agreement be more efficient than an emissions tax?
Before we turn to a full specification of the efficiency of a voluntary agreement relative to an emission tax, we first explore the issue of whether a voluntary agreement can be enforced more cheaply than a tax as suggested by Bailey (1999) , Schmelzer (1999), and Nyborg (2000) . 
Our conclusion that it is always possible that a voluntary agreement is more efficient than an emissions tax comes from the fact that the cut-off value, ( )
, in Proposition 5 is strictly greater than zero. In the proof of the proposition we show that 
Should the government enforce voluntary emissions control agreements?
We have one final issue to deal with. Throughout most of the paper we have assumed that the members of a voluntary agreement finance the enforcement of the emissions standard they agree to. One could envision, however, a situation in which the government allows a voluntary agreement in place of an emission tax and takes on the burden of enforcing the agreement. In this subsection we examine the efficiency of government enforcement of a voluntary agreement.
In our review of Dawson and Segerson's (2007) Our last proposition reveals that while it may be more efficient for the government to enforce a voluntary agreement, it is always more efficient for it to impose the emissions tax instead. The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 6 suggests that it is possible that government enforcement of a voluntary agreement is more efficient than member-financed enforcement, but only if the government is significantly better at enforcement. The reason for this result is that participation with a voluntary agreement is less when the government takes on the enforcement costs than when these costs are borne by the members of an agreement. Thus, free-riding and its associated loss are greater when the government bears the enforcement costs. The government's enforcement advantage must then be large enough to overcome this extra loss if it is to be more efficient for it to enforce a voluntary agreement than to insist that the members of the agreement bear the enforcement costs. However, a voluntary agreement that the government enforces is never more efficient than an emissions tax. Hence, if the government is motivated by the efficient achievement of an environmental quality goal, it should never allow a voluntary agreement among polluting firms that it intends to enforce.
Conclusion
Voluntary agreements made between the government and industries are increasingly being considered as viable alternatives to more traditional forms of environmental regulation. These approaches are often credited with a number of cost-saving advantages over traditional regulations, including the possibility that they are cheaper to enforce. To our knowledge we are the first to model compliance with the requirements of voluntary agreements and the costs of enforcing these requirements rigorously. Clearly, any analysis of the relative efficiency of voluntary versus regulatory approaches must address the relative costs of enforcing the two approaches, and who bears the costs of enforcing voluntary agreements.
Our efforts have provided several new results that have significant relevance for our understanding of the efficacy and efficiency of voluntary emissions control agreements. When firms that participate in a voluntary control agreement finance an independent enforcer to maintain compliance with the agreement, the circumstances under which a voluntary agreement can form in place of an emissions tax are diminished. However, when such an agreement does form, more firms will participate in the agreement than if the agreement could be enforced without cost, or if the government took on the costs of enforcing the agreement. In general, an environmental agreement with member-financed enforcement is not cheaper to enforce than an emissions tax that achieves the same level of environmental quality. However, it is always possible that an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement has enough of an advantage over the government that a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is a more efficient means of achieving an environmental quality target than an emissions tax. Finally, we have shown that there are no circumstances under which the government should take on the costs of enforcing a voluntary agreement, because government-enforced agreements are always less efficient than an emissions tax.
In short, our results suggest that voluntary emissions control agreements can be a more efficient way to meet environmental quality targets than emission taxes, but only if: (1) members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government's environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of a voluntary agreement has significantly better monitoring capabilities or higher sanctions available to it than the government.
(ii) Since ( 
